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ABSTRACT
Research in the pre-paradigmatic, applied scientific field of entrepreneurship is
characterized mainly as exploratory. This article advocates for a considerable shift toward a
more effective applied research agenda. An applied research program is proposed based on
modifications to a Lakatosian research program. The agenda extends beyond typical calls for
more replication work to include a focus on practical outcomes, practical significance, and
surprising findings among other things. The intent is to produce substantially more practical
knowledge – knowledge that is useful to entrepreneurs, policy makers, educators and scholars.

INTRODUCTION
Venkataraman (1997), Shane and Venkataraman (2000) and Shane (2003) have
attempted to realign research in the field of entrepreneurship around the idea of practical
dependent variables focused on opportunity identification and opportunity execution. Shane’s
(2003) interpretation of opportunity execution included various practical entrepreneurial
outcomes ranging from starting a company to going public. Defining an applied social science
such as entrepreneurship in terms of practical dependent variables is a crucial first step in the
search for practical knowledge.

A pragmatic person might wonder to what extent entrepreneurship researchers pursue
practical research programs in order to uncover knowledge useful for entrepreneurs, policy
makers, educators and scholars. If a pragmatist closely examined research in the emerging field
of entrepreneurship over the last thirty years, s/he would likely notice that the field better
approximates a world of loosely connected single studies than one of meaningfully-integrated
research programs – Forscher's (1963) brickyard problem. Further, many researchers come into

the field very briefly in order to publish a single article (c.f. Cornelius et al., 2006). Many of
those who remain frequently switch topics rather than steadfastly focus on a single research area
for an extended period of time. Additionally, a very small percentage of scholars contributes
more than a couple of peer-reviewed articles during a career (Gartner et al., 2006).

In addition to scholar transience, topic-hopping and low productivity concerns, the field
must also face problems related to replication. Replication studies are often overlooked in favor
of original work in peer-reviewed journals. Moreover, when conducted, replication studies
usually do not support initial findings (Hubbard & Vetter, 1996; Evanschitzky et al., 2007). The
failure of various types of replications (across management fields) alone should be enough to
raise concern with respect to the bulk of our practical entrepreneurship knowledge.

There are a number of other steps that the field must take. Our practical knowledge must
be reliable and robust. It is not enough for a single study to be done to identify a predictor of one
or more desirable entrepreneurial outcomes. Entrepreneurs should be provided with replicated
evidence of the validity of constructs and the confidence that desirable outcomes follow from
key predictors (Aldrich, 1992; Chandler & Lyon, 2001; Davidsson, 2004; Kane, 1984; Rosenthal
and Rosnow, 1984). Entrepreneurs also need to know that that a predictor is broadly useful,
rather than limited to a very narrow set of circumstances (Hubbard & Vetter, 1996).
Entrepreneurs want new knowledge that is not blatantly obvious – it should be rather surprising
instead of common sense (Ladik & Stewart, 2008; Armstrong, 2003). Entrepreneurs want a
predictor to be cost effective (Gouldner, 1957; Drummond & McGuire, 1997), as well as
something that they can directly influence (Gouldner, 1957). Further, entrepreneurs would like

to believe that it all makes sense – that there are good and compelling reasons for believing that
changing a predictor, A, will result in a change in a desired outcome, B.

As most researchers know, the list of practical demands above is a tall order for any
research program. Nonetheless, it is important to establish specific objectives for any applied
social science in order to more effectively direct research efforts. This article is proposed as a
step in the direction toward more effectively organizing work in the field of entrepreneurship1. It
is shown below that the field of entrepreneurship, like so many social sciences, is not yet able to
make use of the intellectual devices developed by Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos. Instead, our
proposal for a new ‘applied research program agenda’ here may allow the field to evolve to a
point at which substantial pragmatically useful knowledge is commonly generated2.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
It has appeared to some observers that the dominant philosophy of science in the business
disciplines continues to be logical positivism (c.f. Cohen, 2007; Meyer, 2009). Core logical
positivist values include a distrust of metaphysics (i.e. theory) and a pursuit of objective facts.
The unit of analysis is the protocol statement, a single factual statement linking together tightlyoperationalized variables. The nature of truth is based on correspondence theory in which
empirical findings correspond to an external reality according to their truth value. Hence, the
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2
Our fundamental interest, to advance scholarship, aligns closely with that of Peng & Dess (2010).

role of the scientist is to uncover disparate pieces of concrete conceptual knowledge about the
real world.

Logical positivism began to lose its appeal amongst philosophers of science for a variety
of reasons in the 1960s.

Ultimately, most philosophers adopted a perspective that neither

subjectivity nor theory could be avoided in the scientific process. Logical positivism, it should
be noted, can offer value to a new field searching for basic factual knowledge. For example, it
influences scientists to be wary of the slippage between concept and operationalization,
encouraging them to collect multiple observations.

The dominant replacements for logical positivism are widely considered to be the
intellectual contributions of Sir Karl Popper (1963) and of Thomas S. Kuhn (1962). One might
also include the work of Imre Lakatos (1978), who attempted to reconcile the works of both
Popper and Kuhn.

These three philosophers each worked from units of analysis more

encompassing than the protocol statements emphasized by logical positivists. Popper separated
theory into two categories: scientific theory, which made bold/risky predictions; and prescientific theory, which could not claim such predictions. Kuhn developed the notions of
prescience and scientific paradigm. Lakatos emphasized research programs, which involved
complex clusters of interconnected theories. Popper and Lakatos adopted the correspondence
theory of truth and were decidedly prescriptive in their philosophies. Kuhn, on the other hand,
adopted a consensus theory of truth and in the process, imbued his philosophy of science with a
decidedly descriptive emphasis upon the realpolitik of scientific decision-making.

For Popper’s philosophy of conjecture and refutation to be meaningfully employed in an
emerging applied social science such as entrepreneurship, there are two necessary prerequisites.
First, entrepreneurship researchers would need to draw a strong line between predictive,
scientific theories and explanatory, pre-scientific theories. Empirical research would largely be
confined to testing the former. Currently, there is little indication of such a distinction being
made within the entrepreneurship field.

Second, research undertaken on predictive theory must strongly test the predictive
relationships advocated by a theory. The extent to which such work occurs in entrepreneurship
is debatable. A recent review of tests of human capital theory, one of the most used theories in
the top entrepreneurship journals (Kenworthy & McMullan, 2010), suggests that strong theory
testing may not be commonplace. Human capital theory (HCT) clearly predicts that financial
investments in, e.g. formal education and experience, will yield positive financial returns over
time. Researchers in entrepreneurship, unlike those in economics, chose to not measure
investment costs in any of the fifty-six studies reviewed. Instead, entrepreneurship researchers
loosely invoked HCT in order to draw linkages between human capital variables and a wide
variety of other phenomena. Furthermore, failures to support hypotheses were typically treated
as un-interpretable or invalid.

Such pre-scientific behaviors are evidence that the field of

entrepreneurship may not be prepared to adopt a Popperian philosophy.

Kuhn, like Popper, has much to offer, but not at this time to the field of entrepreneurship.
A scientific field needs a paradigm in order to use Kuhn’s ideas. In the 1960s, Kuhn viewed his
work as mainly contributing to the hard sciences, as in his estimation, the social sciences lacked

any paradigms. Though Kuhn may be debated today, there is little doubt that the field of
entrepreneurship is pre-paradigmatic (c.f. Zahra, 2005) and therefore, not yet ready for Kuhnian
analysis.

Lakatos’ provocative research program concept relies on the existence of at least one
strongly-predictive scientific theory. It involves, among other things, a number of auxiliary
theories that must also be taken into consideration in order to comment on the progressive or
degenerative nature of a research program.

According to Blaug (1975), the notion of a

Lakatosian research program has extremely limited usage within the entirety of the social
sciences.

ASPECTS OF APPLIED RESEARCH PROGRAMS
The problem that we face may be formulated in the following terms: how does a
disparate group of occasionally interacting social scientists participate in meaningful, cumulative
programs of applied research?

How does our research culture shift towards cumulative

programmatic research and away from a predominant focus on single studies? Our proposed
solution is for scholars to have a common understanding of the requirements of an applied
research program and therefore a common knowledge development agenda

We contend that our proposed solution is viable and achievable in part because of the
existence of a few largely uncoordinated applied research programs that have produced some of
our most important entrepreneurship knowledge. Hence, it would seem that at least some

researchers are already asking the types of practical questions about research findings that we
discuss here. Some questions such as whether or not a research finding is replicable are standard
scientific concerns. Others, such as whether or not specific control variables can be manipulated
in a cost effective manner, are less standard.

It is worth pointing out that applied research program agendas are not always directed by
explicit, formalized theory. This may be surprising to at least some people who tend to see
theory as the dominant research-directing mechanism (c.f. Popper, 1963; Zahra, 2007).
Sometimes, the types of research programs that we argue for here, e.g. job generation research,
occur largely in the absence of explicit theory. Of course, this is not to say that there is no
relevant theory. It is simply suggested that theoretical guidance need not be driven by formally
explicated theory. To be scientifically useful, theory must be used in an informed fashion and an
applied research agenda (such as that which we advocate) should provide more comprehensive
direction to the testing of theory.

An Applied Research Program Agenda
The construction of an applied research program (ARP) agenda involves both philosophy
of science and practical concerns. As such, defining characteristics of an ARP are subject to
criticism. We offer a set of eight characteristics that indicate the nature of scientific work to be
included in applied research programs. Four of the characteristics are fundamental for the
definition of an ARP. The other four characteristics arguably designate a desirable knowledge
expansion strategy.

The four fundamental characteristics of an ARP are, as follows:

Practical Outcomes In order for a set of studies to constitute an applied research program, at
least some of the studies need to focus on practical outcomes. A focus on practical outcomes
implies that the dependent variables in tested models need grounding in practical issues typically
of concern to entrepreneurs (c.f. Shane and Venkataraman, 2000; Shane, 2003). Entrepreneurs
are interested in investing in variables that most influence economic outcomes such as revenue
and profit growth.

There can also be instances in which dependent variables in the field of entrepreneurship are of
less concern to entrepreneurs but still of concern to scholars, educators and policy makers. Job
creation (Birch, 1979), for example, is strongly associated with entrepreneurship, but it is of little
interest to specific entrepreneurs.

Instead, the job creation findings substantially influence

government support and programming for new ventures.

Evidence of Replicability In order for a set of studies to constitute an applied research program
they collectively must exhibit evidence of replicability. In 2002, Dov Eden (p. 844), an editor of
the Academy of Management Journal, proclaimed that, “…replication research is indispensable
for scientific progress.” His strong belief is held across the social sciences (Dewald, Thursby &
Anderson, 1986; Feigenbaum & Levy, 1993; Tsang & Kwan, 1999).

Unfortunately, the

publication of replication studies work is uncommon across many scientific fields, including the
business disciplines. According to Hubbard and Vetter (1996), replication work in leading
business journals represents less than 10% of published empirical work in accounting,
economics, and finance and 5% or less of published empirical work in management and
marketing.

To identify a number of studies as a progressive applied research stream, many of those studies
must have developed evidence of replicability. There must be credible evidence to convince
scholars and practitioners that research findings will remain consistent across time, contexts and
cultures, and research methodologies. Exceptions should only exist when explicitly predicted or
otherwise appreciated as ad hoc adjustments to the generalizability of the findings.

Practical Significance In order for a collection of studies to be considered an applied research
program, the findings must exhibit practical significance, rather than mere statistical
significance. “Statistical significance,” according to Kirk (1996, p. 746), “is concerned with
whether a research result is due to chance or sampling variability; practical significance is
concerned with whether the result is useful in the real world.” Statistical significance is often
investigated via null hypothesis significance testing, a technique that has been heavily criticized
by leading social scientists (c.f. Carver, 1978; Cohen, 1990; Meehl, 1967; Rozeboom, 1960;
Schmidt, 1996).

Kirk (1996) refers to the measures of practical significance as measures of effect magnitude.
The magnitude or strength of a relationship, i.e. the amount of variance accounted for in the
dependent variable, can be measured in a variety of ways, the most popular being Cohen’s d.

It appears that effect sizes are already being reported to some extent in entrepreneurship studies
and that effect sizes are higher than expected (Connelly et al., 2010). Such findings bode well
for the development of practically-significant knowledge that is useful to entrepreneurs and other
relevant stakeholders.

Unexpected Findings In order for a set of studies to constitute an applied research program they
must provide findings that go beyond common sense.

Surprising findings differ from current practice or current beliefs…Surprising
findings may be innovative or new, although not always. When the problem is
important, surprising findings are likely to be controversial or unpopular.
Armstrong (2003, p. 71-72)

An applied research program cannot only accept findings that support existing theories and
contentions. It must be open to surprising and counter-intuitive findings. Such findings can be
generated from implicitly theoretical research or from strongly predictive theories that, when
right, set up ‘damn strange coincidences’ (Salmon, 1984). Counterintuitive findings, according
to Lindsay et al. (1998, p. 215), “…demonstrate the superiority of science over common sense.”
In the early 1960s, the field of social psychology, from which entrepreneurship research draws a
number of theories, went through a transition from demonstrating the obvious to focusing on

counterintuitive effects. The shift toward non-obvious findings led to a number of productive
research consequences including increased researcher enthusiasm; unexpected research results;
and, productive debate (Kelley, 1992).

Such a set of defining characteristics should help us recognize findings, theoretically
supported or otherwise, that hold practical potential for entrepreneurs. When identifying a
current research program we recommend that scholars appreciate and accommodate the factors
that tend to bias published research findings (Meehl, 1990). Most commonly, we suggest that
researchers take into consideration the totality of both supporting and non-supporting findings
despite some additional difficulties associated with the interpretation of non-supporting findings.

----------------------------

The next four agenda characteristics expand the usefulness of entrepreneurship
knowledge:

Address Why and How An applied research program attempts to answer the how and why
questions. According to Whetten (1989), how and why are two of the essential building blocks
for effective theory development. The how building block handles the manner in which factors
(i.e. variables, constructs and/or concepts) are related to each other. The key relationships, and
their complexities, are typically depicted graphically for purposes of presentation, testing and
refinement. The why building block offers a rhetorical explanation for the underlying logic (i.e.

a theory’s assumptions) of the causal model.

According to Sutton and Staw (1995, p. 376),

good theory should be, “…rich enough that processes have to be described with sentences and
paragraphs so as to convey the logical nuances behind the causal arrow.”

Controllable Variables
…the applied social scientist is concerned not merely with identifying
predictively potent independent variables, but also with discovering some that
are accessible to control.
Gouldner (1957, p. 97)

An applied research program makes an attempt to identify variables that can be manipulated by
practitioners (Bauer, 1951; Gouldner, 1957). Controllable variables such as business strategies
are desirable because they enable entrepreneurs to directly influence survival, growth and
success.

The distinction between uncontrollable and controllable variables does not, however, imply that
uncontrollable variables should be dismissed.

According to Hobbs (1969, p. 243),

“…uncontrollable variables are important from the standpoint that they may establish the context
of change, or the limits of effect of controllable variables.”

Eliminate Alternative Explanations
For those of us who grant that theory testing is meaningful…this lack of testing is
an undesirable state of affairs…these tests should be comparative - that is, against a
rival paradigm or research program (Kuhn, 1962; Lakatos, 1970).
(Pahre, 1996, p. 221)

An applied research program attempts to eliminate alternative explanations for phenomena under
observation. The ubiquitous existence of multiple explanations is typically known as underdetermination. The process to reduce under-determination involves strong attempts to refute
rival scientific theories. Though refutation may be a strong word, the idea is that the type of
applied research program described here positions the field of entrepreneurship to examine
scientific evidence and weigh the relative strengths of competing theories against each other.
The outcome is stronger applied knowledge about, e.g. new venture survival and success.

Cost-effective Solutions An applied research program should uncover numerous controllable
variables that vary in magnitude and implementation costs. Hence, an applied research program
will also undertake to examine and compare the cost-effectiveness of the most powerful
controllable variables. Cost-effectiveness analysis (c.f. the field of medicine – McClellan &
Newhouse, 1997; Stinnett and Mullahy, 1998) compares incremental cost and incremental
effectiveness of existing versus new interventions based on empirical results. The results of
cost-effectiveness analysis allow entrepreneurs to make more informed decisions about key
aspects of starting and growing new ventures.

ILLUSTRATIONS OF APPLIED RESEARCH PROGRAMS

Two illustrations of applied research programs are described below. The first illustration
involves the development of knowledge with respect to entrepreneurship and job generation. In
this case, a highly provocative finding directly influenced scholars from around the world to seek
replications and/or refutations.

The second illustration, that of using creativity to predict

entrepreneurial performance, is interesting because it appears that the researcher efforts involved
were much less coordinated than in the job generation case.

Entrepreneurship and Job Generation
David Birch (1979) found that 81.5% of all net new jobs created in the US from 1969 to
1976 were located in small firms with less than 100 employees. Birch’s finding was not just
statistically significant but practically significant, as well.

The evidence influenced policy

makers around the world to vigorously promote various small business initiatives. For many
neo-classical economists, however, the counter-intuitive findings flew in the face of both theory
and ideology.

Replications, cross-validations, extensions and practical significance studies

ensued. An early US-based replication study (Armington & Odle, 1982) indicated that only
35.8% of net new jobs created were by small firms, and that Birch was wrong. However, the
study used a traditional, static measure of job creation and further, it was restricted to data from a
recessionary period.

Armington (1983) and Armington and Odle (1983) conducted more sophisticated
replications of the Birch (1979) study and found in favor of the dominance of entrepreneurial
(i.e. new small business) job generation.

In 1987, Birch found that companies with 1-19

employees accounted for 82% of net job creation and large firms (i.e. with 5000+ employees)
suffered net losses of 13.5%.

In the UK, Doyle & Gallagher (1987) found that only companies in the 1-to-19 employee
category showed employment growth.

Blanchflower and Burgess (1996) found that

establishments with less than 100 employees accounted for a disproportionately large share of
job creation and for destruction, a disproportionately small share. In Canada, Picot, Baldwin &
Dupuy (1994, 1998) found that a disproportionate share of employment was created over the
short and long runs by small firms during recessions and recoveries. Over a three year period,
5% of small firms created 43% of jobs. In Norway, Spilling (1996) found that 1% of new
establishments accounted for 44.8% of total job creation over a nine-year time frame. Further,
2.4% of new establishments accounted for 57.9% of total job creation. In Sweden, Davidsson et
al. (1998) found that small firms outperformed large firms in terms of gross and net job
generation.

Back in the US, the Small Business Administration (1998, 1999) developed a database
for more accurately tracking interclass movement. An analysis of the data revealed that 75% of
net new jobs from 1990 to 1995 were created by small businesses (<500 employees). Further,
the small business job generation rate was almost triple the large business (500+) rate: 10.5% and
3.7%, respectively.

Over the years, only a small number of studies have not replicated the Birch (1979)
finding. White and Osterman (1991) reviewed Wisconsin unemployment records and found that

two and four-digit SIC analyses reveal that, longitudinally, small firms do not account for the
bulk of net job generation. Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1993, 1996) tackled what they
considered the job generation myth by investigating the US manufacturing sector and reported
that firms with at least 500 employees account for half of jobs generated. Interestingly, the
Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1993, 1996) studies were heavily criticized by numerous
economists and entrepreneurship scholars for data and method limitations and problems (c.f.
Davidsson et al., 1998; Carree and Klomp, 1996; Kirchhoff and Greene, 1998).

Ultimately, the initial Birch (1979) finding spawned a substantial program of research to
further understand and interpret the macro-economic relevance of entrepreneurs.

Creativity and Entrepreneurial Performance
Joseph Schumpeter (1942) did not formally predict that more creative people will
develop more successful businesses. The notion does, however, appear to underlie his thinking.
Thus, the post-Schumpeter creativity research in the field of entrepreneurship is more theoryinspired than theory-directed. A recent review of the extant creativity research uncovered 28
empirical studies that linked creativity with entrepreneurship (McMullan, 2009).

The creativity research program has grown slowly, over a thirty year period. The articles
are not very well-cited and they tend not to be published in top-rated journals. The facts are,
however, that many of the creativity researchers used practically relevant measures of outcomes
such as start-up, growth and profitability. The researchers conducted constructive replications

and cross-validated findings by using different measures of creativity and substantially different
sample populations from many different countries. Moreover, a sizable number of studies found
not only statistical significance but evidence of practical significance as well (c.f. Khan, 1987;
Khan and MacMillan, 1988; Verhees and Meulenberg, 2004).

The proportion of outcome

variance often accounted for in the creativity studies is surprisingly high in spite of measurement
difficulties in the area of creativity (Clapham, 2004; Kaufman, 2006). For most entrepreneurship
scholars it is normal to expect entrepreneurs to be more creative than the average person, though
anything but conventional wisdom to expect creativity to account for a substantial portion of
entrepreneurial performance.

With respect to the eight research program aspects addressed above, the creativity
research evidence does a better job of establishing entrepreneurial creativity as an applied
research program (requirements 1 – 4) than it does further developing the usefulness of this
established knowledge (requirements 5 – 8). The only attempt to study the enhancement of
entrepreneurial creativity is disputably David McClelland’s work in India (McClelland and
Winter, 1969), in which he attempted to enhance subjects’ need for achievement. A cost-benefit
analysis of such intervention strategies seems a long way off in part because control is a major
problem in this line of research.

Nonetheless, there are occasional attempts at building

theoretical explanations for such a relationship and useful empirical results may arise from
facilitating better self-selection and more effective investment strategies.

In summary, the empirical studies linking creativity with entrepreneurial performance
generally meet the minimum requirements of the aforementioned applied research program

agenda. The success of this research program occurred in spite of what appears to be a lack of
common knowledge about the various empirical findings amongst the participating creativity
researchers.

This applied program of research may have been, more or less, accidentally

spawned by the diversity of concepts and measures characterizing creativity, and by a number of
people who envisaged the reasonableness of the idea of the creative entrepreneur.

Comments on Illustrations
The two illustrations above suggest that applied research programs, corresponding to the
definition provided here, do occur naturally in the field of entrepreneurship. There are also other
examples. The published empirical studies of the SBDC counseling effects is an example of an
applied research program that has been coordinated for over 25 years by a single scholar, Jim
Chrisman.

The need for achievement research is another example of an applied research

program that existed due to efforts by a mainly uncoordinated group of researchers.

Some of the applied research programs appear to be more explicitly theory-directed than
others. It is interesting to note that many people in the field of entrepreneurship likely believe
that McClelland’s (1961) theory was the directional force behind the need for achievement
research, and to an extent, this is the case. McClelland created a theory that emphasized the
importance of need for achievement in entrepreneurship as well as in economic development.
Some of his key assumptions were that entrepreneurs represented an important dimension in
economic growth and that entrepreneurial success and need for achievement were positively
correlated.

McClelland’s theory, however, predicted that macro-level interventions would

promote an entrepreneurially vibrant economy.

Hence, his theory did not provide direct

effective guidance to the largely micro-level research on individual need to achieve.

A similar argument could be constructed regarding the weak link between Joseph
Schumpeter’s macro-level theory and the empirical research linking entrepreneurial creativity
with entrepreneurial performance. What is interesting about the insights here is that explicit
theory played a limited role in guiding effective research. This suggests that something other
than formal theory can be used to direct the generation of useful knowledge. Further, that the job
generation and creativity research programs managed to cover the minimal requirements of an
applied research program agenda suggests that some researchers already have mental models of
useful knowledge that do not vary greatly from the research agenda being advanced here.

PROGRESSIVE VERSUS DEGENERATIVE RESEARCH
PROGRAMS IN APPLIED SOCIAL SCIENCES
As previously mentioned, Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos each focused on different units of
analysis in order to examine intellectual progress in the natural sciences. They also analyzed the
waxing and waning of research programs through those unitsBuilding on Popper and Kuhn,
Lakatos (1970) advocated a model for the critical assessment of a research program.

He

distinguished between advancing and declining (i.e. progressive and degenerative) research
programs. From Lakatos’ perspective, research programs tend not to be completely refuted.
Instead, ongoing ad hoc adjustments are often made to models in order to save them from non-

supportive findings. The accumulation of ad hoc modifications, however, may eventually lead
researchers to acknowledge the limitations of a research program or merely lose interest in it.

In the pre-paradigmatic social sciences (Kuhn, 1962; Lakatos, 1999), the Lakatosian notions
of progressive and degenerative research programs require some adaptation to better suit the
characteristics of applied research programs established above. Below, we suggest six criteria
that signal a degenerative program and promote disengagement from faltering research streams.


Failure to cross-replicate research results with different measures, with different sample
population or under different circumstances.



Weakening of the explanatory power of predictors in better-controlled studies.



Failure to find controllable variables that can be modified to meaningfully affect new
venture performance.



Failure to eliminate competing explanations, particularly when competing ones explain
more of the phenomena of interest or more of the desired outcome variance.



Failure to find evidence that supports the cost-effective manipulation of controllable
variables.



Increasing doubt due to spurious correlations or the existence of administrative artifacts
that explain key relationships.

The last suggested criterion, about spurious correlations, may represent the greatest threat to
the long-term progress of promising research programs. A key reason for the threat is that the
social sciences do not typically allow for the kinds of controlled experiments found in some of
the hard sciences that bolster confidence in the integrity of a cause and effect relationship.

IN SUMMARY
The direction for non-cumulative, solo-study research has come, however implicitly,
from logical positivism. The influence of logical positivism has declined in philosophy of
science and many scientific fields have sought to fashion research efforts around the ideas of
Kuhn, Popper and Lakatos. It is argued that the applied scientific field of entrepreneurship
research should also transition away from the influence of logical positivism. It is further argued
that the natural replacements to logical positivism do not yet represent a good fit with the
entrepreneurship field.

An applied research program agenda is proposed to help direct the development of
cumulative research towards practical knowledge. The argument bears some things in common
with the position papers advocating for more replication research but extends beyond the single
issue of replication. The elements of the proposed applied research program are recognizable as
substantial modifications to the Lakatosian research program. The entrepreneurship research
program is, therefore, supported or refuted in a manner more appropriate for a pre-paradigmatic
applied social science.

The applied research agenda should encourage a critical mindset. It should direct the
development of knowledge across studies over time by helping entrepreneurship researchers to
more critically appreciate the usefulness of extant and new findings, as well as determine what
groupings of studies constitute promising applied research programs.

It is important to point out that we do not suggest all independent studies to be without
worth, but rather we demonstrate that the agenda required to develop practical knowledge is
sufficiently time consuming and study intensive to require a substantially larger proportion of the
global entrepreneurship research effort.

In order to demonstrate that the advocated approach to knowledge development has been
used to positive effect in entrepreneurship in the past, job generation and entrepreneurial
creativity research efforts are described. The outsider assistance research program spearheaded
by Jim Chrisman is offered as another example. Scholars in the entrepreneurship field are hence
encouraged to identify additional existing applied research programs, evaluate their progress and
propose future directions in line with the philosophy advocated here.
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